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"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and
great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass

by because they did not deal with the Constitution or a telephone company, yet
which have in them the germ. of some wider theory, and therefore of some profound interstitial change in the very tissue of the law."-OLVER WENDELL HOLMES,
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 269.

Recent Cases
REAL POPERTY-TITLE UNDER UNRECORDED DEED-SOLDIER'S AND SAILOR'S
CIVIL RELIEF Acr

Godwin v. Gerling'
In a recent Missouri case involving the construction of Section 302, subsection
1 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 as amended in 19422 suit
was brought to set aside a trustee's deed to vacant lots in a subdivision executed
pursuant to a foreclosure sale under a power of sale in a deed of trust. One

1. 239 S.W. 2d 352 (Mo. 1951).
2. Oct. 17, 1940, c. 888, 54 Stat 1178, as amended Oct. 6, 1942. 56 Stat. 769;
50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 501 et seq. (1951).
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Godwin had purchased the lots, but for his convenience had taken and recorded
the title in the name of his secretary. In November 1941, at Godwin's direction
and for his benefit, his secretary executed a deed of trust upon the lots securing
certain notes. Neither the payee of the notes nor the trustee had knowledge of
Godwin's interest. Prior to entering military service in 1942 his secretary conveyed
the lots to him by warranty deed subject to the deed of the trust. This deed
was never acknowledged nor recorded. The notes and deed of trust through
subsequent transactions were negotiated to one Gerling in 1943, and in July 1944,
upon default in payment of interest, he requested the trustee to sell the lots under
the power of sale. Godwin remained in the military service when the foreclosure
sale took place; Gerling purchased the lots apparently without knowledge of Godwin's interest. Before the bringing of suit some of the lots had been purchased by
other bona fide purchasers. Godwin contended that he was the owner of the
lots in question when he entered service, and therefore a foreclosure without
agreement or court order was void under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act. Under the Act, Section 302, subsections 1 and 3 provide (emphasis added):
"(1) The provisions of this section shall apply only to obligations secured
-by mortgage, trust deed, or other security in the nature of a mortgage
upon real or personal property owned by a person in military service at
the commencement of the period of the military service and still so owned
by him which obligations originated prior to such person's period of
military service."
"(3) No sale, foreclosure, or seizure of property for nonpayment of any
sum due under any such obligations, or for any other breach of the terms
thereof, whether under a power of sale, under a judgment entered upon
warrant of attorney to confess judgment contained therein, or otherwise,
shall be valid if made after the date of the enactment of the Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1942 (Oct. 6, 1942) and
during the period of military service or within three months thereafter,
except pursuant to an agreement as provided in section 107, unless upon
an order previously granted by the court and a return thereto made
and approved by the court."
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that Godwin was not entitled to have the
trustee's deed set aside, for he was neither an equitable nor a legal "owner" at
the commencement of his military service, but under the recording act his only
interest in the lots was that of an "equitable claim" assertable only against his
secretary. Not being an "owner" he was not entitled to the protection of the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act. The court further states that equity will
not aid one who comes into court with unclean hands, and though the conduct
of the petitioner was not actually fraudulent, nevertheless, by withholding from
the record notice of his title he had made it possible for fraud to be perpetrated
upon innocent third persons, which Congress clearly did not intend to be one
of the purposes of the Act.
Courts which have construed Section 302, subsection 1 of the Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 19183 and the Act of 1940 as amended in 1942 (the
3. Mar. 8, 1918, c. 20 §§ 100-604, 40 Stat. 440-449; 50 U.S.C.A. App.
§ 101, et seq. (1951).
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section of the earlier and later Act being substantially the same) have consistently
held that equitable owners as well as legal owners are encompassed within the
term "owner" and thus entitled to the protection of the Acts apparently irrespective
of the recording acts of the various states. 4 In Hoffman v. Charleston Five Cents
Savings Bank, 5 the first case to construe Section 302, subsection 1 of the Act of
1918, the petitioner, an officer in military service, brought suit in equity to enjoin
the completion of a foreclosure sale, the deed not having been delivered to a
purchaser. The petitioner, expecting to be called into military service, had conveyed legal title to his mother subject to the mortgage of the defendant. The
deed was duly recorded in the name of his mother, but there was an oral agreement
that only if he failed to return would the property be hers. Holding that the
petitioner was the equitable owner of the property, the court declared the foreclosure invalid. The Arizona Supreme Court in Twitchell v. Home Owners' Loan
Corporation," decided under Section 302, subsection 1 of the 1940 Civil Relief
Act as amended in 1942, recognized the applicability of the Act to unrecorded
equitable ownership by permitting the petitioner, who was in military service, to
intervene in a foreclosure proceeding. He alleged an oral agreement between him
and his mother, who was both the record and legal owner of the property, that she
was to convey to him upon consideration for her support and for his making
payments on the property. The court cited with approval the Massachusetts
decisions, stating at page 27 that:
"We think these decisions are consonant with the spirit of the Act.
It was meant to protect the interests of those who were called to the
defense of their country and who, for that reason, were unable to keep
up the payments upon obligations which they had incurred previous to
to their being called into service."
It should be noted that in both of the above cases the servicemen, who held
the unrecorded equitable interests, came forward and asserted them before a deed
in foreclosure had been delivered to a bona fide purchaser. If the recognized construction of the Act is that it should be liberally administered and al reasonable
doubt should be determined in favor of the serviceman to protect his interest,7
there would seem to be little reason for not affording protection to his equitable
interest when a bona fide purchaser has not intervened. However, in Godwin v.
Gerling a deed had actually been delivered to a bona fide purchaser and some of
the lots had been conveyed to subsequent bona fide purchasers. Such facts present
4. Hoffman v. Charlestown Five Cents Savings Bank, 231 Mass. 234, 121
N.E. 15 (1918); Twitchell v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 59 Ariz. 22, 122 P. 2d 210
(1942); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lester, 234 Mass. 559, 125 N.E. 594
(1920); Morse v. Stober, 233 Mass. 223, 123 N.E. 780 (1919); Petition of Institution for Savings in Newburyport and Its Vicinity, 309 Mass. 12, 33 N.E. 2d 526,
137 A.L.R. 448 (1941).
5. Supra, note 4.
6. Supra, note 4.
7. Boone v. Lighter, 319 U.S. 561 (1943); Franklin Soc. for Home-Building
& Savings v. Flavin, 265 App. Div. 720, 40 N.Y.S. 2d 582 (1st Dep't 1943),
aff'd 291 N.Y. 530, 50 N.E. 2d 653 (1943), cert. den. 320 U.S. 786 (1943).
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a far more difficult problem-that of protecting a serviceman's interest but at the
same time maintaining a degree of stability of titles under well recognized
property law. Failure to give effect to the recording acts would mean that every
purchaser would have to ascertain at his peril the possibility of secret equities of
unknown persons in military service. Thus, no purchaser could safely acquire title
from a foreclosure sale until all servicemen had been discharged, and all conveyancing would be placed in a state of uncertainty. This would seem to place an
unreasonable burden on civilian interests, and, as the Missouri Supreme Court in
the Godwin case states, it is unlikely that Congress intended such an interpretation of the Act.
Earlier decisions in Missouri had consistently held that an unacknowledged
and unrecorded deed was effective to pass legal title, subject of course to divestment
by a subsequent conveyance from the record owner to a bona fide purchaser. The
court stated in Pew v. Price:
"It is not essential to the conveyance of real estate between parties,
that the instrument of transfer should be either registered or recorded."6
The Missouri Supreme Court also stated in State v. Page (emphasis added):
"It is well settled in this state that deeds of private persons, though unacknowledged and therefore not eligible to record, are valid and effective
to pass title as between the parties and their privies in blood and as against
persons having actual notice thereof."0
Similar statements are found in many other Missouri cases. 10 However, in the
Godwin case it was said that the petitioner was not an "owner" but merely had
an equitable claim. It is not too clear what constitutes an equitable claim, or
how an "owner" is to be distinguished from a "claimant." Following the general
rule, when the petitioner paid the consideration for the property and 'invested
legal title and recorded it in the name of his secretary to hold for his benefit, it
would seem that a resulting trust would immediately arise by operation of law
and the petitioner would be deemed the equitable owner."1 Missouri decisions
have been in accord with this general rule,12 and though in theprincipal case the
petitioner is said to have had only an equitable claim, it would seem to be
equivalent to equitable ownership. Likewise to hold that after the petitioner had
received an unacknowledged and unrecorded deed from the legal owner of record
he had no more than an equitable claim, seems to cast some doubt as to what is
the status of the holder of an unrecorded deed in Missouri.
8. 251 Mo. 614, 620, 158 S.W. 338, 339 (1913).
9. 332 Mo. 89, 95, 58 S.W. 2d 293, 295 (1933).
10. Elsea v. Smith, 273 Mo. 396, 202 S.W. 1071 (1918); Hiler v. Cox, 210
Mo. 696, 109 S.W. 679 (1908); Caldwell v. Head, 17 Mo. 561 (1853); Southern
v. Southern, 52 S.W. 2d 868 (Mo. 1932); GILL, MissouRI TrrLEs § 384 (3rd ed.
1931); Mo. REv. STAT. § 442.400 (1949), and annotations thereunder.
11.

2 RESTATEMENT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 440 (1935); 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND

TRUSTEES § 454 (1935); 54 AM. J. § 206.
12. Mays v. Jackson, 324 Mo. 1224, 145 S.W. 2d 392 (1940); Bowen v.
McKean, 82 Mo. 594 (1884); Baumgartner v. Guessfeld, 38 Mo. 36 (1866).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol17/iss4/3
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Two other recent Missouri cases, Shaw v. Armstrong'$ and King v. Fasching,"
where the holders of unrecorded deeds were permitted to establish independent- titles
by adverse possession as against the claimants under tax deeds, seem also to
question the effectiveness of an unrecorded deed to convey title. This problem
has been discussed at length by Bruce A. Ring in his comment, Adverse Possession
Under Unrecorded Deed.15 In Shaw v. Armstrong and King v. Fascking the court's
observations with regard to the effect of unrecorded deeds on title were unnecessary to the holdings in these cases. In the principal case the court's problem was
to get around the unqualified word "owner" as used in the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act. The actual decisions in all three cases seem to be sound. However, it does not necessarily follow that in other types of situations the grantee
under an unrecorded deed will be held to have only an equitable claim, but he
may and probably will be determined to have legal title in accord with earlier
Missouri cases.
The actual result of the Godwin case appears to be that only recorded legal
and equitable ownership will be included within the word "owner" used in Section
302, subsection 1 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act where the rights of
bona fide purchasers have intervened. Such a requirement, that of recording a
serviceman's status or ownership, would be in accord with the general policy of
protecting an innocent purchaser from undisclosed claims which are impossible
to discover by the most diligent search of the record and still accomplish the
purpose of the Act-that of protecting persons in military service from the enforcement of their obligations when their ability to discharge them has been materially
affected by serving their country.16 By construing this section as not affording
protection to unrecorded interests of a serviceman the purposes of both the state
recording acts and the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act may be given effect
since the serviceman can with little difficulty record such interest as he may have
upon entering service.
MARY F. GiBsON

13. 235 S.W. 2d 851 (Mo. 1951).
14. 234 S.W. 2d 549 (Mo. 1950).
15. 16 Mo. L. REv. 461 (1951.
16. Bowman v. Peterson, 45 F. Supp. 741 (D.C. Neb. 1942).
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